Record of the 23rd APCCA
Agenda Item Four
1. INTRODUCTION
Major prison disturbances are commonly regarded as a glaring failure of prison management. Consequently, this is not only a topic of enormous significance to all prison administrators, but is also a very sensitive issue. It is therefore important to record the frank and candid manner in which delegates spoke – often revealing insights into the differing dynamics of prison disorder across the region and some differences in emphasis with respect to responses to major incidents. It was particularly instructive to hear accounts of how specific incidents developed and of their outcomes / resolution.
At worst, major disturbances and incidents have resulted in the deaths of staff or prisoners. For example, staff were killed in a major prison riot in Singapore in the early 1960’s and, much more recently, in Thailand and the Philippines. Over the past five years, prisoners have been killed in Fiji, Pakistan and the Philippines. However, it is important to record that events of this magnitude are uncommon and isolated; and prison disturbances are clearly not endemic or commonplace in any jurisdiction.
China, Hong Kong (China), Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand gave formal presentations on this topic. The Rapporteur summarised the main themes and delegates then discussed the topic.
2. DEFINITIONS
It is not uncommon for the normal routine of prisons to be disrupted either by minor incidents or by incidents that are serious but only involve disputes between individuals or groups of prisoners. These can include:
Ø Prisoners’ rivalry (including fights involving individuals or gangs, hidden weapons, bullying and intimidation).
Ø Individual prisoners’ protests by means such as refusing to work, refusing to obey orders, climbing on the roof or hunger strikes.
Ø Strikes, where groups of prisoners refuse to work.
There is no easy or pre-defined dividing line between incidents of this sort and ‘major disturbances’. It is certainly not simply a matter of numbers. For example, in one case reported by Thailand, over 1000 prisoners at one prison went on strike but there was ‘no turmoil.’ On the other hand, in some cases, smaller groups (of, say, 30-40 inmates) have been responsible for significant disturbances.
Another example of definitional difficulties, in both official and media reports, is provided by the serious disturbance at Western Australia’s major maximum security prison (Casuarina Prison) on Christmas Day 1998. The media, prisoners and staff almost invariably refer to this as the ‘Casuarina Riot’ but the official investigation team and management reject the label ‘riot’. This is because, in their view, the incident was not primarily triggered by underlying grievances nor motivated by a desire for systemic change, but was the more spontaneous outcome of a set of specific circumstances, including the fact that prisoners had obtained access to large quantity of drugs. In essence, therefore, the dividing line between minor incidents, major disturbances and riots is largely a matter of degree and may, to some extent, involve a choice of label.
As Hong Kong (China), Singapore and several other jurisdictions pointed out, however, ‘minor’ incidents involving individuals and non-violent group protests can escalate to become major disturbances if they are not promptly and effectively addressed. An example of such apparent escalation is provided by the Hei Ling Chau Drug Treatment Centre incident in Hong Kong (China) in June 2000. There was tension between a small group of around 10 Vietnamese inmates and local prisoners over a number of matters, including what the local prisoners saw as preferential treatment for the Vietnamese. An unplanned attack by a group of Vietnamese on one local man escalated to a group fight and the Vietnamese inmates retreated to their dormitory. Hundreds of local inmates then set it alight, attacked staff with stones, and set up barricades with gas cylinders. Order was only restored by force.
3. CAUSES OF MAJOR DISTURBANCES
It is not possible to generalise about the causes of prison disturbances because each one reflects a particular set of issues and factors at the institution in question. Every major disturbance also takes its own specific course. Quite often, major incidents seem to reflect a number of factors and there is rarely a single cause. Broadly speaking, the conference papers and presentations revealed three main sets of factors: those that relate to the attitudes and behaviour of individual prisoners; those that involve systemic issues within the particular institution or within the prison system itself; and broader socio-political influences.
(a) Prisoners’ Attitudes and Behaviour
The papers generally took the view that the most significant factors behind major incidents relate to systemic issues (see below). However, there are also a number of concerns with respect to the attitudes and behaviour of prisoners:
Ø Anti-authoritarian attitudes on the part of prisoners were not generally identified as a major factor, but do have significance in specific contexts. China, Hong Kong (China) and Korea, for example, raised the issue of prisoners who increasingly question the legitimacy of their incarceration. Fiji faces problems with respect to a group of high profile prisoners who attempted to overthrow the government, regard themselves as political prisoners, and do not respect traditional boundaries.
Ø Rivalry between prisoner groups can contribute to tension and serious disorder. Several jurisdictions (including Canada, India, Indonesia, New Zealand and the Philippines) mentioned ethic groupings and gangs as growing problems. This is a difficult area because prisoners sometimes form rather loose affiliations for reasons of personal safety and for an enhanced sense of security rather than as a ‘threat’ to the good order of prisons. However, in terms of the specific incidents that were discussed at the conference, ethnic tensions clearly played a role in the Hei Ling Chau incident in Hong Kong (China). The delegation from Indonesia also referred to the problem of ‘social jealousy’ between inmates from different socio-economic backgrounds.
Ø Access to Drugs / Alcohol can be another factor. In the Casuarina incident in Western Australia, prisoners obtained prescription drugs that had not been adequately secured. In New Zealand, a serious incident occurred in 2003 after prisoners got access to alcohol.
(b) Systemic / Structural Causes within the Prison System
Although prisoners’ behaviour is a factor in some serious incidents, the conference papers showed that it would be dangerously complacent to ignore the underlying ‘structural’ or ‘systemic’ factors that generally exist in cases of major disturbances. These factors vary in both degree and content between jurisdictions but may well include some of the following:
Ø Prison conditions, including overcrowding. Fiji, Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia all mentioned this as a very significant factor. In the words of the Fiji delegate, a serious incident in 1980 was ‘a case of sheer neglect.’
Ø Access to services such as health services, treatment programs, and education.
Ø Issues surrounding daily prison life, including visits, food, welfare services and other aspects of prisoner wellbeing.
Ø Boredom through lack of work or other things to keep prisoners occupied: there was a strong consensus in the country papers (see also the report on Workshop One) that work provides an important outlet for prisoners’ energy and skills.
Ø Due Process and Access to Justice. The papers identified two aspects to this problem. First, as mentioned by Malaysia and Pakistan, remand prisoners can become frustrated by delays in the processing of their cases and, as a consequence, long periods held on remand. (This intersects with other causal factors because remand prisoners tend to have less access to work, education and treatment programmes). Secondly, as discussed under Agenda Item Two, poor prisoner grievance procedures can be a significant source of tension.
(c) Socio-Political Influences
The oral presentations by Fiji and the Philippines vividly demonstrated that broader socio-political developments can also influence the climate in prisons and may be a major factor in serious disturbances. In the Philippines, some prison incidents have coincided with political upheaval. In Fiji, political turmoil in 1997 and 2000 appears to have directly influenced not only the timing of prison disturbances but also the form that those disturbances took. In 1997, political tensions between Indigenous Fijians and Indian Fijians spilled over to the prisons and in one case, Indigenous prisoners marched on Government House to voice their protests. In 2000, a combination of civilian and military forces took over the Parliament and took the Prime Minister and some of his colleagues hostage. Shortly afterwards, there were a number of disturbances in the country’s prisons, marked by a strategy of hostage taking (or attempted hostage taking) and the use of hostages to back up political demands.
4. CONTAGION
Research in both Europe and North America has pointed to the problem of contagion: in other words, a major prison disturbance at one prison may have a ‘knock-on’ effect in other prisons, with disturbances breaking out across the system. Within the Asian and Pacific region, there have been mixed experiences with respect to contagion. In some jurisdictions (including Australia and New Zealand), it does not appear to have been evident to any significant extent, with disturbances usually being confined to one prison. However, there was strong evidence of a contagion effect in Fiji, the Philippines and Thailand. It was shown by both the close timing of incidents and similarities in the form that disturbances took. For example, in Thailand, following one incident in which a truck was hijacked by prisoners (with apparent initial ‘success’) a number of similar incidents occurred within a short timeframe.
5. PREVENTIVE STRATEGIES
It is obvious that the best way to deal with major disturbances is to prevent them arising in the first place. This point was made in numerous papers, from which at least four preventive strategies could be identified:
Ø Addressing the systemic issues identified above, such as living facilities, food, education and work.
Ø Staff recruitment and attitudes are important to running a fair and responsive prison system. This was the primary focus of the presentation by China and also featured prominently in a number of other country papers.
Ø Intelligence is very important in identifying issues, groups and individuals of concern. The Australian paper called this ‘the most important policy.’ Malaysia referred to its increasing focus on intelligence as a means of identifying ‘high risk inmates’, and Indonesia to the importance of strong intelligence networks in order to challenge the inmate ‘code of silence.’
Ø Contingency Training and Planning assumes particular significance, not least because, through most of the region, serious disturbances are rare events. It should include regular refresher training for prison staff, strong advance contingency planning and simulated exercises. Singapore showed part of an interesting video of one such simulated training exercise in which a section of one prison was first isolated and then brought under control by force.
6. RESPONDING TO INCIDENTS
As the paper from China stated, even the best preventive strategies cannot guarantee that prisons will be free of serious disturbances. When incidents do occur, three main options are possible, and they were outlined very clearly in the Hong Kong (China) paper. They are ‘dialogue and negotiation’, the ‘tactical response’ and the ‘waiting response.’
(a) Dialogue and Negotiation
Many papers stressed that the first stage in dealing with any major disturbance is to engage in dialogue with the prisoners and to attempt to resolve the matter by negotiation. This means that prisons departments must be able to call upon people with effective and professional negotiation skills. Some jurisdictions mentioned that this may involve collaboration with police services or other agencies.
Although dialogue and negotiation are the agreed starting point, there are obviously limits to which prison administrators will be prepared to negotiate. Some jurisdictions appeared to be more prepared to accede to prisoners’ requests than others. In one case in Thailand, for example, the authorities agreed to prisoners’ demands that the prison governor should be replaced – a decision that would seem most unlikely in many jurisdictions. In Fiji, at the time of the political upheavals of 1997 and 2000, prisoners were allowed to march to Parliament offices to make their protests without being arrested or forcibly detained. After making their views known (and, on one occasion, being given a cup of tea with one of the nation’s leaders), they returned to the prison.
(b) Tactical Response
The core goal of a tactical response is to reclaim the prison by force. Singapore made a powerful video presentation of a simulated tactical response exercise. Generally, this is the task of prison staff but the precise structural arrangements differ between jurisdictions. It is also important, as far as possible, for prisons to have agreed protocols with police, fire and ambulance services – especially as fire is a regrettably common facet of prison protests. For this reason, joint simulation exercises may be desirable.
The presentation from Thailand raised another interesting point. They noted that prisoners themselves had, on more than one occasion, played an important role in returning control and good order to a prison.
(c) Waiting Response
A number of papers noted that some incidents will die down simply as a matter of time. However, it is uncommon for prison administrators simply to leave an incident without attempting to enter a dialogue or negotiation. It may therefore be better to see the ‘waiting response’ as a component of the other two strategies rather than an option in its own right.
Dialogue and negotiation and tactical responses are therefore the most common approaches. They are not mutually exclusive and tend, in practice, to work together. However, the tone of the papers and presentations indicated that different jurisdictions may place rather different weight on each strategy. This may be a reflection of geographical and cultural factors as well as staff training / resources. For example, the presentations by Fiji and Thailand (with their strong focus on negotiation and waiting) contrasted with the presentation by Singapore (including the video), in which there was a quick and firm tactical response.
7. SPECIALIST RESPONSE GROUPS
There are different levels of response capacity. Onsite prison staff provide the first line and should have the capacity at least to ‘hold’ a situation for a period of time. Many jurisdictions also have more specialised units, usually called something like the ‘Emergency Response Team’ (Korea), the ‘Critical Incident Response Team’ (New Zealand) or the ‘Tactical Response Group’ (parts of Australia). Often, these groups are based at an appropriate central location (or locations) so that they can reach the site in question at short notice.
There is general agreement that such specialist groups have an important role but there are a number of issues surrounding their capacity and organisation:
Ø Local staff must also have sufficient training and it would be dangerous to rely too heavily on specialist groups. This is especially important if prisons are scattered around a jurisdiction. For example, in the 1960’s incident in Singapore, it was difficult to get back up to the island on which the prison was located. Western Australia’s emergency response team is based in Perth, several thousands of kilometers from some of the State’s regional prisons (though it is interesting to note that the major disturbances in Australia have generally been in metropolitan prisons).
Ø There are dangers in placing too much reliance on specialist groups if there is a contagion problem; they cannot be in several places at once.
Ø Several papers (including New Zealand) commented on the need to prevent specialist groups becoming unaccountable ‘elites’ who regard themselves as above normal prison rules and regulations. To this end, it is important to ensure that members of such groups do not lose contact with the realities of daily prison life.
8. POST-DISTURBANCE MANAGEMENT
Although the papers focused mainly on the causes of major disorder and the restoration of order, it is important not to neglect the question of what to do after order has been restored. First, there will generally be a range of issues surrounding prisoner discipline – including the use of internal disciplinary charges and the referral of more serious matters to outside courts. Tensions will inevitably be running high, so it is important also to ensure that staff use appropriate official channels and do not resort to unofficial forms of ‘punishment’ or revenge.
Secondly, since prison disturbances often reflect a failure of prison management, there may need to be appropriate management responses. Depending on the circumstances, these may include enhanced physical security measures and / or improved staff/prisoner relationships.
Thirdly, the needs of prison staff should not be forgotten. Serious disturbances, especially when they result in a loss of control, are a frightening and psychologically damaging experience and can profoundly affect the capacity of staff to work and to feel safe at work. For this reason, a number of jurisdictions, including New Zealand, have established specialist teams to provide support to staff.
9. CONCLUSION: ‘SAY A LITTLE PRAYER’
The delegation from Thailand encapsulated the issues in this area with the amusing but perceptive observation that prison administrators should ‘say a little prayer’ each day. The presentations at this conference showed that prisons run smoothly when prisoners are co-operative and that, if tensions rise too high, on site staff have only a limited capacity to prevent disturbances.